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Good afternoon. It is a pleasure to have the opportunity to present my views to the 
Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, which has come to be popularly 
known as the Dunlop Commission. 
I am grateful to Chairman John Dunlop for inviting me to speak here today. I take this 
occasion to state how much I enjoyed my service on this Commission, from the date that I was 
appointed by Secretary of Labor Robert Reich on March 24, 1993 until my confirmation as 
Chairman of the National Labor Relations Board on March 2, 1994. I am certain that this 
Commission will play a valuable role in the debate about labor law reform that will take place in 
the coming years. 
I wish to reiterate the views which I articulated in my confirmation hearing testimony 
before the United States Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee on October 1, 1993. 
My views about labor law policy reforms — views which I express again today — are those that 1 
have stated in books, articles and speeches as an academic, impartial arbitrator and labor law 
practitioner during these past 33 years. And, of course, my views about policy are mine alone and 
not necessarily those of other Board Members or the General Counsel. 
As Chairman of the National Labor Relations Board my role is both to administer the 
National Labor Relations Board and interpret the National Labor Relations Act. In that 
connection, I have attempted to identify cases and issues which are or may be before the agency. 
I am sure that you appreciate the fact that I cannot comment in any way upon matters that are sub 
judice or which, in my judgment, may come before the Board in future cases 
* * * * * * 
Almost 60 years ago Congress and President Roosevelt formulated a significant policy 
change through the adoption of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 creating an unfair labor 
practice and representation election system which remains intact today. The Act, creating a kind 
of Bill of Rights for workers throughout most of the private sector and a system of conflict 
resolution for certain disputes between management, unions and individual employees has been 
emulated in much of this country's public sector and, at least through the '60s, was regarded as 
model for a rule of law which would foster good labor management relations. 
The starting point for any consideration of changes in the National Labor Relations Act 
must be the preamble of the statute itself. The public policy of the United States remains rooted 
in the promotion of the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and the freedom of 
association of all workers. The Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin amendments make clear and, in 
my judgment appropriate, the view that union as well as employer abuses are in need of 
regulation. All future revisions of existing policy must be sufficiently evenhanded so as to gain 
both the confidence and involvement of labor, management and individual employees. 
Today an enormous number of problems have emerged under the statute At the Board 
we have noted the Commission's examination of the number of employees who are dismissed 
during union organizational campaigns in its Fact Finding Report. Regrettably, we do not have 
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statistics which shed light on this issue but we are presently attempting to enhance our statistical 
capabilities so that we can determine the full extent of this problem and obtain accurate and 
precise data. 
Similarly, we have noted the Commission's reference to the Federal Mediation and 
Conciliation Service statistics on the number of instances in which collective bargaining 
agreements are concluded subsequent to certification. Again, this is a matter which I have 
instructed our statistical gathering unit to examine and to include in future data. 
Nonetheless, there are significant problems which exist, principally due to both the period 
of time and the way in which representation proceedings are pursued as well as in the delays 
inherent in unfair labor practice litigation 
Some of the problems in these areas can be dealt with and are being addressed by the 
Board itself. I have convened a rulemaking committee which is placing its primary attention on 
ways in which the entire representation process can be streamlined. The objective is to eliminate 
wasteful delay and litigation. Our principal problem is that representation cases which are 
litigated can take three or four months or more This means that a party desiring delay holds the 
whip hand in negotiations about a stipulation on eligibility, the unit, the question of whether the 
ballot will be by post or on plant premises, etc. 
v 
The committee, composed of Board representatives from both Washington and the 
regional offices, is concerned with the ways in which specific periods of time can be set for a joint 
conference, hearing, election and any post-election hearing that may result from the conduct of 
election itself. The committee is also concerned with the ways in which the hearing process itself 
can be expedited through such vehicles as subpoenas with the service of the petition, a rule to 
Show Cause why the petition for a unit is inappropriate, and offers of proof about the position 
that a party wants to take on unit issues. In Bennett Industries. Inc ' we have already determined 
that a party cannot go to hearing on an issue about which it refused to take a position. 
Additionally, we are examining the extent to which unit presumptions can be imposed. On 
June 3 of this year, we issued an advance notice of intent to engage in rulemaking in connection 
with disputes about whether a single or multiple facility unit is appropriate. We are now 
reviewing commentary that we have received in June and July 
As some of the members of this Commission may know, the Board has employed a 
presumption that where a union petitions for one facility that that facility will be appropriate as a 
bargaining unit. The difficulty has been that by virtue of the numerous criteria which the Board 
purports to use in adjudication, the volume of litigation on this issue seems to have grown 
because parties are encouraged to believe that one or two of the criteria may carry the day for 
them in a hearing. 
1 313NLRB 1363(1994) 
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Currently the Board is examining the question of whether in retail, trucking and 
manufacturing the use of a relatively explicit rule, e.g., whether a second facility is within one or 
two or three miles of the facility petitioned for, could resolve the issue. That is to say, if there 
was no facility within the geographical radius established by the rule, the petition would be 
granted as appropriate with almost complete automaticity. 
The rulemaking committee will also look at the question of whether it is appropriate to 
have two separate full-fledged appeals to the Board in Washington in the form of both a pre-
election request for review as well as post-election objections to the conduct of elections. 
Similarly the question of the circumstances under which the Board can order an election without 
resolving eligibility issues, saving this matter for post-election review should the number of 
employees in dispute turn out to be outcome determinative, is another issue that is before the 
Board. 
On the election itself, the Board has expanded the use of postal ballots to situations where 
call-in employees may not be present, at the employer's facility on the date of the election, 
Shepard Convention Services. Inc., 314 NLRB No. 115 (1994), as well as situations where 
employees are not able to vote at plant premises because, for instance, they are on strike and have 
other jobs.* 
Under consideration is the question of whether the postal ballot will be used where, in the 
Regional Director's determination, it is cost effective to do so because of a substantial distance 
between the plant premises and the regional office and the costs involved in sending Board 
personnel to such offices Similar consideration is being given to the more frequent use of 
alternate sites, other than plant premises, for elections in the interest of neutrality. 
On unfair labor practices, through my office, the Chief Administrative Law Judge has 
instituted timetables for Administrative Law Judges to handle such cases. I have convened a case 
management committee which will meet for the first time next week. It will ultimately 
recommend to the Board both timetables for the period of time that it takes the Board to hear 
unfair labor practice cases as well as other mechanisms designed to expedite our procedures. 
Currently it takes the Administrative Law Judges five to six months to issue a decision after the 
hearing has been convened and it takes the Board, on average, 242 days to process the case 
subsequent to the time that the case comes here. 
Furthermore, the Board has issued a proposed rule which would allow Administrative 
Law Judges to issue, under appropriate circumstances, bench decisions, based upon the oral 
summation of the parties, within 72 hours after the conclusion of the hearing without requiring 
briefs. This would take place where: (1) the issue was exclusively or primarily one of credibility; 
(2) the law and facts were not in dispute; (3) the case involved a single issue record of relatively 
short duration, i.e., not more than a day or so. 
2
 Lone Star Northwest. Inc.. 36-RD-1434 (unpublished decision May 18, 1994). 
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Again, in order to diminish wasteful and time consuming litigation — the purpose of many 
of our initiatives described above — settlement judges-* would be available if they are deemed to 
be appropriate by the Chief Administrative Law Judge or one of his associates. Such judges, from 
our own Administrative Law Judge corps, would attempt to mediate the dispute without the 
authority to adjudicate. The theory here is that if the parties have the expert assistance of a third 
party, they will be willing to discuss a possible compromise when they know that the party will 
not use any concessions or compromises against them in the adjudication process Information 
produced and positions taken will be confidential. Meanwhile, in addition to the proposed rule 
itself, we are attempting to use pre-hearing settlement conferences by the Administrative Law 
Judge in the ordinary course of casehandling. 
In cooperation with the General Counsel, we have authorized a record number of Section 
10(j) injunctions. As of this date we have authorized 64 cases for 10(j) relief in the six-and-a-half 
months that we have been here in Washington. This, along with our contempt authority, is a most 
important part of the law enforcement features in our statutory scheme. 
Finally, the question of whether the Res-Care doctrine under which the Board may not 
assert jurisdiction over certain entities which have contracts with the government is being 
reconsidered in Management Training Corporation. 27-RC-7374. Similarly, I have stated that I 
would like the Board to reconsider its current policy of excluding contingent, or as the Europeans 
characterize them, atypical employees, from existing bargaining units when they have been 
referred by another employer. Amongst the issues that the Board will be called upon to address in 
future cases are: (1) the precise standard to be employed in defining a joint employer, (2) the 
circumstances, if any, under which joint liability can be imposed, (3) the circumstances under 
which a community of interest can be found between contingent employees and permanent 
employees; (4) the legal standard applicable to secondary pressure against one of a number of 
employers that may be regarded as joint employers or about which there is some debate relating 
to their neutrality. As you may know, with regard to (3) my colleague, former Chairman James 
Stephens, has indicated that it may be appropriate for the Board to reexamine its existing 
precedent^ — and I agree with him. 
While it may be that full and complete remedial relief for illegal aliens, who are employees 
within the meaning of the Act by the virtue of the Supreme Court's Sure Tan decision, * can only 
be accomplished by statutory amendment, the issue of reinstatement and backpay involving illegal 
aliens is currently before the Board in A P R A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group. Inc.. 29-CA-15446. 
The statute excludes agricultural employees. However, the question of the precise 
demarcation line between agricultural and non-agricultural workers has been recently addressed in 
Produce Magic. 311 NLRB 1277 (1993). Even if your Commission recommends that our 
jurisdiction be extended to cover farm workers, - and there is no logical reason for that exclusion 
A decade ago I noted that our system is relatively deficient in settling post-complaint 
unfair labor practices. See W.B. Gould, Japan's Reshaping of American Labor Law. (MIT 
Press 1984), pp. 44-62. 
The Brookdale Hospital Medical Center. 313 NLRB 592, n. 4 (1993). 
104 S.Ct. 2803 (1984). 
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— the question of an appropriate accommodation between California's comprehensive legislation 
and federal law needs to be addressed. We are currently considering the extent to which we 
might enter into an agreement with the Agricultural Labor Relations Board through which our 
jurisdiction could be ceded to it in certain areas. 
Penultimately, we have pending before us the question of whether corporations which are 
engaged in both air and trucking are within our jurisdiction or the jurisdiction of the National 
Mediation Board and the question of what kind of deferral, if any, is appropriate on an inter-
agency basis .6 
Finally, it may be that this Commission will wish to reconsider the jurisdictional yardsticks 
frozen by Congress through the 1959 Landrum-Griffin amendments. My judgment is that no 
change is warranted because: (1) such revisions would deny the opportunity to bargain 
collectively to a large number of workers in states without mini-NLRBs and, (2) as my colleague, 
Professor Robert Flanagan has shown, the jurisdiction assumed does not seem to have caused a 
large increase in the Board's caseload since 1970.' 
UNION ACCESS TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 
v. 
The Supreme Court in Lechmere8 held that, in most cases, non-employee union 
organizers who wish to communicate with employees for the purpose of organization may be 
excluded from private property by the employer My judgment is that Lechmere is an erroneous 
interpretation of our statute but it is the law and any policy designed to provide employees with 
maximum amount of communication and information provided by both unions and employers 
must come from Congress and not the Board. * Meanwhile, however, the question of whether: 
(1) union organizers may have access to private property for the purpose of publicizing a labor 
dispute to the public under standards different than Lechmere; and (2) the question of whether, 
under the Board's representation procedures, union access of some kind may be fashioned, are 
both open issues not explicitly resolved by Lechmere 
UNION RECOGNITION 
Two avenues for reform exist here. The first is a pre-hearing election which would 
expedite our procedure enormously. The question of whether this is authorized under the statute 
or our Rules and Regulations is now before the Board in Angelica Healthcare Services Group. 
Inc. As you may know, from 1945 through 1946 pre-hearing elections were used with great 
6
 Federal Express. 4-RC 17698-S and United Parcel. 8-CA-24212. 
7
 R. Flanagan, Labor Relations and the Litigation Explosion. (The Brookings Institute 
1987) pp. 31-32(1987). 
8
 112 S.Ct. 841(1992). 
9
 See W.B. Gould, Agenda for Reform: The Future of Employment Relationships and the 
Law. (MIT Press 1993), p. 158. 
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success in terms of a dramatic decline in the cases which required formal Board action. The 
assumption has been that the Taft-Hartley amendments reversed this practice. See, for instance, 
Twelfth Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board, n. 48. Chairman Boyd Leedom 
advocated pre-hearing elections at the time of the Landrum-Griffin amendments but subsequent to 
a statement by Senator Barry Goldwater on the pending legislation on July 24, 1959, the 
conference committee stated that: 
[T]he right to a formal hearing before an election can be directed is 
preserved without limitation or qualification. 
A second measure which the Commission might want to consider is the practice prevailing 
in Canada, i.e., recognition on the basis of authorization cards with evidence of a promise to pay 
union dues (the latter feature has been abandoned in Canada) where a super-majority of 60 
percent or more support the union and pay dues. Such an approach would be based upon the 
voluntary choice of those who are serious enough to obligate themselves financially and would 
expedite the electoral process. 10 
THE DUTY TO BARGAIN 
Under the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, both unions and employers have a 
duty to bargain in good faith. But one of the difficulties with the administration and enforcement 
of the statute lies in the fact that there is no duty to consummate a collective bargaining 
agreement. Indeed, the Supreme Court has advised us in H.K. Porter v. NLRB^' that the Board 
is precluded from imposing any substantive term upon the parties.^ This means that in most 
cases the only remedy to a duty to bargain violation is a simple cease-and-desist order which 
requires the parties to bargain in good faith in the future or to "go thou and sin no more " 
The question of whether a party may be compensated for lost expenses incurred in the 
negotiation process is a matter which is before the Board now. But, as noted above, the Board 
cannot impose an agreement. Legislation of the kind which has been adopted by some of the 
Canadian provinces to impose first-contract arbitration would be a first step towards filling this 
vacuum. 
The Supreme Court in Linden Lumber Div. Summer & Co. v. NLRB. 419 U.S. 301 (1974) 
has approved the use of secret ballot box elections rather than the authorization cards as a 
basis for determining recognitional issues absent unfair labor practices which erode 
employee free choice. 
90 S.D. 821(1970). 
See W.B. Gould, Agenda for Reform, supra, p. 220. The statute is deeply flawed 
remedially, as interpreted by the Supreme Court See Republic Steel Corp v. NLRB. 311 
U.S. 7 (1940): Phelps Dodge v. NLRB. 313 U.S. 177(1941). Note "NLRB Power to 
Award Damages in Unfair Labor Practice Cases," 84 Harvard L. Rev. 1670 1684 (1971). 
This makes reform necessary in the area of unlawful discharges as well as the duty to 
bargain 
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I wish to make clear that I do not advocate first contract arbitration as a remedy for bad 
faith bargaining. This would be ill advised because: (1) of the time-consuming nature of litigation 
before the use of arbitration; (2) the relatively poor prospects for success where the parties have, 
by definition, been poor partners. The most appropriate circumstance for first contract arbitration 
would be to trigger it, most probably subsequent to mediation, after a certain period of time 
subsequent to the Board's certification had elapsed. 
PLANT CLOSURES AND THE DUTY TO BARGAIN 
The Supreme Court held in First National Maintenance v. NLRB.*3 that the employer did 
not have a duty to bargain about its decision to partially close an operation. Quite clearly, 
however, the conditions of employment of the employees were affected because they lost their 
jobs altogether. My judgment is that the statute should be amended so as to provide that there is 
a duty to bargain wherever the conditions of employment are arguably affected by the policy 
about which the one party seeks to bargain. 1* It is anomalous to preclude bargaining about 
decisions which affect the job security of workers 
DISCLOSURE OBLIGATION 
The Supreme Court held in NLRB v. Truitt^' that management has a duty to open its 
books to the union where it pleads poverty or an inability to pay which will force it to the wall 
(A disclosure obligation where inability to pay is based upon competitive consideration remains 
open for the Board to resolve.) However, there is no duty to disclose relevant information where 
the position taken by the employer is allegedly based upon other considerations 
The effect of the Truitt decision has been that employers, which do not wish to disclose 
the basis for their economic positions, will simply refuse to assert an inability to pay, but rather an 
unwillingness to do so — or take the position that their decision is based upon what are alleged to 
be comparable conditions elsewhere. Accordingly, this rule like that set forth in First National 
Maintenance, inhibits dialogue when it should be promoted. Again, the rule should be, as in 
connection with organizational disputes, that employees should have the maximum amount of 
information that is available. **> 
Employees ought to be able to know the economic facts of life which affect them and their 
job and financial security Unless the data sought is confidential in the sense that its disclosure 
would injure the employer's competitive position, the union should have automatic access to all 
1 3
 101 S.Ct. 2573(1981). 
•4 See W.B. Gould, Agenda for Reform, supra, p. 173. 
1 5
 76 S.Ct. 753 (1956). 
1 6
 See W.B. Gould, Agenda for Reform, supra, pp. 173-4. 
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information which might arguably affect the employer's capability to offer wages and conditions of 
employment at the bargaining table. 
SUCCESSORSHIP 
A major factor in the increase of some non-union facilities are the rules relating to 
successorship. In the first place, absent contractual limitations in the collective bargaining 
agreement itself, under no circumstances can the collective bargaining agreement negotiated 
between the seller and the union be imposed upon the purchaser. Moreover, the purchaser (or 
new merged operation) is less likely to be identified as a successor if it does not rehire employees 
previously employed by the predecessor. This means that unless it can be shown that the decision 
was instigated for anti-union reasons, there is an incentive to deprive employees of their jobs so 
that the employer can be free of any kind of bargaining obligation with the union. This is an 
extraordinary and anomalous result in a society which is concerned about both preserving 
bargaining and job security policies. And there is little, if anything, that the Board can do here 
about the general rule. 
Congress should, therefore, reverse the relevant Supreme Court authority and: (1) impose 
a collective bargaining agreement upon the successor operation ~ and a duty,to bargain about 
appropriate modifications; (2) explicitly establish the irrelevance of the number of employees hired 
to the successorship definition. 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MORE COOPERATIVE AND LESS ADVERSARIAL 
RELATIONSHIPS THROUGH EMPLOYEE COMMITTEES OR WORKS COUNCILS 
Again, consistent with both my approach to both union organizational activity under 
Lechmere and the duty to bargain issues arising under H.K. Porter. First National Maintenance, 
and Truitt. my view is that communication between employees and employers must be enhanced 
in both the union and non-union environment. Accordingly, my view is that Section 8(a)(2) 
should be amended as it relates to both unionized and non-union establishments. With regard to 
the former, the statute should resolve all ambiguities by allowing employers to provide unions 
with access to plant facilities, desks, secretarial help, xeroxing, office space and the like without 
fear of offending the statutory prohibition against unlawful assistance and support. 
Similarly, communication between employees and employers where there is no union 
present should be enhanced as well. The new members of the Board have not yet had an 
opportunity to address the Electromation issue and it would therefore be inappropriate for me to 
comment on the existing Board interpretation as well as the recent decision by the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 
However, as a matter of policy, it seems appropriate for Congress to allow financial and 
other forms of support to committees composed of employees or employee and management 
representatives which address conditions of employment as well as so-called managerial concerns 
9 
such as the quality of the product, sales problems and the like. The fact of the matter is that, as in 
the duty to bargain area, there is no appropriate demarcation line between employment conditions 
and so-called management prerogatives which, in fact, affect such conditions. Employees and 
employers ought to be encouraged to communicate and participate with one another through the 
provision of information and involvement in the decision making process in all such areas. So 
long as the committee is not hierarchical in the sense that its employee representatives are selected 
or imposed by the employer or others and the mechanism has not been instituted in response to 
union organizational campaigns, the statute should allow it. 
This same approach governs my advocacy of representation through unions on a 
"members only" basis, where they do not represent a majority of employees within the bargaining 
unit. As you know, the statute permits relationships between consenting employers and unions on 
a "members only" basis where the union does not represent a majority of employees. There is no 
reason why a duty to consult and notify cannot be imposed where it is on a limited number of 
issues such as discharge or discipline, health and safety, where a significant number of employees, 
e.g., 20 to 30 percent in the establishment, desire such representation. An amended statute could 
impose a limit on the number of such relationships or require that, where more than one union 
seeks such limited representation, it must be done at the same table with another. The rule should 
allow a union that seeks representation on an exclusive basis through majority status to displace 
and eliminate other such relationships in the establishment 
These forms of representation, voluntarily established employee committees and limited 
representation by unions on a non-exclusive basis, where no other representation exists, would be 
infinitely preferable to a works council or employee representation system mandated by a statute. 
The conundrum involved in such an approach lies in the fact that if it is prescribed only for non-
union establishments, the works council becomes a rival to the union, promoted by public policy 
itself, in any union organizational campaign On the other hand, if it is mandated in all 
establishments, it represents an incursion upon the unions' exclusive bargaining representative 
status — particularly under an amended statute which would mandate the parties to bargain for all 
matters that arguably affect employee conditions. 
Foreign experience, particularly of successful countries, like Germany and Japan, is useful 
and appropriate. But partial transplantation from a different system is a dangerous thing This 
Commission and Congress should tread warily about adopting fully systems which have been 
devised in the context of other legal frameworks and cultures. It must be remembered that the 
system of exclusive bargaining representative status based upon majority support is peculiar to 
North America and, particularly the United States and Canada. A transplanted works council 
system would create difficulties for our system of exclusive bargaining representative status. 
But the overriding point is that for some representation, voluntarily adopted or mandated 
by statute, should be part of an amended statute. 
ECONOMIC PRESSURE AND DISPUTES 
10 
The issue of permanent replacement for economic strikers is a matter that is beyond the 
Commission's scope and one that has been recently considered by the House of Representatives 
and the Senate. However, other areas would be properly before the Commission and, 
accordingly, I have included some comments upon such issues. 
As a matter of policy, my view is that the law relating to lockouts should remain as it is 
presently fashioned. A lockout, in the context of an established relationship where substantial 
bargaining has taken place, is an appropriate response by the employer to perceived union 
economic pressure. From a policy perspective — I have not yet had the opportunity to express 
myself on this subject under existing law ~ the employer should be permitted to use temporary 
replacements under such circumstances as the law provides at present. While the law should 
actively intervene to promote both freedom of association and the collective bargaining process, 
there is no need to interfere with the ability of the parties to inflict economic pressure and indeed 
pain upon one another through the normal rules of combat. 
The collective bargaining process promotes autonomy and the parties must be left to their 
own resources to fashion their own weapons of economic pressure This is my view about strikes 
and a principal part of my reasoning for promoting an effective right to strike. This means that 
employers should be prohibited from making use of permanent replacements, thus depriving 
workers of their jobs when engaged in the strike. Similarly, employers ought not to be inhibited in 
their right to continue the production process both during the strike or a lockout. 
I am of the view that, as a general proposition, the law on secondary economic pressure, 
in the form of strikes or picketing, should remain as it presently exists. New problems have 
emerged which are important to a number of industries such as the use of double-breasted 
operations and industries which use contingent workers ~ but these present issues which either 
are or will be before the Board and conceivably may not require statutory amendment depending 
upon the way the Board resolves these issues. 
1 believe that the Supreme Court's Buffalo Forge17 decision which precludes employers 
from obtaining injunctions against a union's violation of a no-strike clause where the stoppage is a 
sympathy strike rather than one which arises out of the alleged violation of the collective 
bargaining agreement by the employer is wrong. A principal part of the employer's bargain is its 
ability to obtain industrial peace and where the union has voluntarily entered into a no-strike 
pledge in the collective bargaining agreement, the employer ought to be able to get its side of the 
bargain through the most effective remedy available, i.e., the injunction, whether the cause of the 
stoppage is the fact that the employees are in sympathy with others or whether they seek to obtain 
their position on the collective bargaining agreement itself through economic pressure. 
Accordingly, the Buffalo Forge decision should be overruled and I would hope that this 
Commission would make such a recommendation to both the Congress and the President. 
1 7
 Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers. 428 U.S. 397 (1976). 
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Finally, as I have previously written, I would recommend that strike votes on a decision to 
strike be mandated by statute, as is the case in Canada.^ That would mean that an unauthorized 
strike -- in this case one undertaken without the consent of the majority through internal union 
procedures would be unprotected.*' 
UNION SECURITY DUES PROBLEMS. ISSUES 
Two major Supreme Court decisions have exaggerated the confusion that exists in the law 
of union security. In NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers2^ the Court held that unions could impose 
disciplinary sanctions upon strikebreakers but that their ability to do so is determined by the 
degree of membership possessed by the worker. Where the worker is a "full member" the union 
may discipline the worker. In Pattern Makers v. NLRB2! the Court held that the union could not 
impose sanctions upon strikebreakers who had resigned from the union because they were at the 
other end of the continuum, i.e., they possessed no membership at all! 
The problem with this area of the law is that the average worker, let alone union and 
management representatives, knows very little about the gradations in membership for which the 
law provides, as interpreted by the Supreme Court. The Board can oblige the union to advise 
employees of their right under the statute to be less than a full member22 — or the Board might 
consider providing advice to the employees which could emanate from the agency itself.2-> A 
contrary policy simply invites employers to promote the distribution of such information in a 
garbled or anti-union form and, in the absence of the information being provided by others, the 
employer will be called upon by dissident workers who may anticipate union sanctions. 
However, the better approach would be for Congress, or the Court, to eliminate the 
distinction between the limited and full membership. Again, the area is one which promotes 
confusion and an area which is little understood by unions and management, let alone individual 
employees. 
The law should remain unamended insofar as the right to resign articulated in Pattern 
Makers is concerned But it should be amended in other respects. The flaw in Pattern Makers 
was the unwillingness of the majority to strike a balance between the competing right to engage in 
concerted activity on the one hand and the right to refrain on the other. Under a statute which 
provides for the right to refrain, its seems appropriate that there is a right to resign - but not a 
right to resign at any time under any circumstance. Because both Justice White's opinion, — 
which provided the majority with its majority -- and in part, the Court's majority opinion by 
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 See W.B. Gould, Agenda for Reform, supra, pp. 230-32. 
1 9
 See W.B. Gould, "The Status of Unauthorized and Wildcat' Strikes Under the National 
Labor Relations Act," 52 Cornell Law Quarterly 672 (1967). 
2 0
 388 U.S. 175(1967). 
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 105 S.Ct. 3064 (1985). 
2 2
 Cf. Paramax Systems Corporation. 311 NLRB 1031 (1993). 
2 3
 See W.B. Gould, "Solidarity Forever - or Hardly Ever: Union Discipline, Taft Hartley and 
the Right of Union Members to Resign," 66 Cornell L. Rev. 74 (1980). 
12 
Justice Powell itself relied upon the Board's expertise, it may be open to the Board or the courts 
to reconsider this rule. But Congress could provide the most immediate and least controversial 
resolution of this matter through simple amendment of the statute. It could provide that the right 
to resign be exercised at a reasonable period of time, i.e., when a worker would be likely to have 
knowledge of union policies prior to the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement which 
the union could designate through its constitution and advise employees through formal notice. 
* * * * * 
It is a pleasure to be with you here today. I welcome your interest in and your questions 
on our work and the future of national labor policy. 
